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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Zuatney Gonzalez appeals following the district court’s order denying her motion for
credit for time served.  Ms. Gonzalez asserts that the district court erred in denying her credit for
82 days of prejudgment incarceration when she was being held in the Bannock County case
while she was incarcerated in the Canyon County Jail.  Although the district court granted
Ms. Gonzalez’s motion in part, giving her credit for time served from the service of the Bannock
County arrest warrant on March 3, 2016, until she was sentenced on the Bannock County case on
May 2, 2016, a Bannock County hold was placed on December 11, 2015, thus, Ms. Gonzalez
was in custody on this case for an additional 82 days, from December 11, 2015, until March 3,
2016.    Ms. Gonzalez argues that the plain language of Idaho’s credit for time served statute
mandates credit for her prejudgment, concurrent incarceration in Canyon County where she had
a Bannock County hold during her Canyon County incarceration.  She is owed an additional 82
days of credit for time served.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On September 30, 2015, an officer responded to Sportsman’s Warehouse, after an
employee had reported that two individuals had used fictitious credit cards to make purchases of
approximately $6,700.  (R., p.16.)   The individuals were identified as Alberto Torres and
Zuatney Gonzalez.  (R., p.16.)
Based on these facts, Ms. Gonzalez was charged by information with criminal possession
of a financial transaction card, burglary, and grand theft.  (R., pp.38-40.)  Pursuant to a plea
agreement, Ms. Gonzalez pled guilty to an Amended Information charging her with two counts
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of unlawful possession of a financial transaction card.  (4/19/16 Tr., p.8, Ls.10-20, p.11,
Ls.11-14, p.21, L.3 – p.22, L.3; R., pp.56-66.)   In exchange for her guilty plea, the State agreed
to dismiss the remaining count and to recommend a sentence concurrent with Canyon County
case number 2015-19062.  (4/19/16 Tr., p.8, Ls.15-20; R., pp. 56-66.)
On  each  of  the  unlawful  possession  of  a  financial  transaction  card  charges,  the  district
court imposed five years, with one year fixed, concurrent with each other and concurrent with
the Canyon County sentence.  (5/2/16 Tr., p.34, Ls.10-19; R., pp.77-81.)  The district court told
Ms. Gonzalez it would give her “credit for all time served that you have been sitting in Bannock
County that you should receive on this charge; okay?”  (5/2/16 Tr., p.34, L.25 – p.35, L.2.)  The
judgment of conviction did not reflect any credit for time served.  (R., pp.77-81.)
Ms. Gonzalez filed a Motion for Credit for Time Served.  (R., pp.84-87.)  Ms. Gonzalez
asked for credit for the 134 days she spent in custody in Canyon County after the Bannock
County warrant was issued.1  (7/18/16 Tr., p.8, L.9 – p.9, L.14; R., p.84.)  In support of her
motion, she attached a booking record indicating she had a Bannock County hold beginning
December 11, 2015.  (R., p.87.)  After a hearing on July 18, 2016, the district court granted the
motion in part and denied the motion in part.  (R., p.95.)  The court issued a written order giving
Ms.  Gonzalez  credit  only  from  the  date  she  was  served  with  the  Bannock  County  warrant  on
March 3, 2016, to the date of Bannock County sentencing of May 2, 2016, but denied her credit
for the full 134 days (October 21, 2015, to March 9, 2016) she requested.  (R., pp.90-95.)
Ms. Gonzalez made an oral Rule 35 motion asking the district court to reconsider the
sentence to give her credit for the time she was incarcerated in Canyon County so that the time
1 Although Ms. Gonzalez initially requested 134 days of credit for time served, on appeal
Ms. Gonzalez asserts that she is entitled to an additional 82 days of credit for the time she was
held on the Bannock County charges starting on December 11, 2015.  (R., p.87.)
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for parole on all sentences would be consistent.  (8/22/16 Tr., p.36, Ls.9-18.)  The district court
denied the motion for leniency after a hearing.  (8/22/16 Tr., p.37, Ls.2-15; R., pp.106-107.)
Ms. Gonzalez filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s order denying her
credit for time served and the subsequent Rule 35 motion.  (R., pp.99-102.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Gonzalez’s motion for credit for time served?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Gonzalez’s Motion For Credit For Time Served
A. Introduction
Ms. Gonzalez asserts that the district court erred when it denied her request for credit for
time served.  Ms. Gonzalez is entitled to credit for pre-judgment incarceration for all of the time
she was held in conjunction with the charges in her Bannock County case.  Ms. Gonzalez asserts
that, because the facts in the record clearly establish she is owed an additional 82 days of credit
for the time she was being held in Canyon County, on the Bannock County charges, from
December 11, 2015, to March 3, 2016, the district court erred in denying her motion for credit
for time served.  She respectfully requests that this Court order that she be given credit for time
served in the amount of 82 days.
B.  Standard Of Review
A determination as to “[w]hether the district court properly applied the law governing
credit for time served is a question of law over which” appellate courts exercise free
review. State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170 (Ct. App. 2006).  On appeal, the appellate court will
“defer to the district court’s findings of fact, however, unless those findings are unsupported by
substantial and competent evidence in the record and are therefore clearly erroneous.” Id.  The
Court exercises “free review over statutory interpretation because it is a question of law.”
State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 3 (2015).
C.  The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Gonzalez’s Request For Credit For Time
Served
The Idaho Criminal Rules specifically provide that a defendant may file a motion to
correct the calculation of credit at any time.  I.C.R. 35(c).  Further, as the Idaho Court of Appeals
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has recently made clear, “the language of I.C. § 18-309 is mandatory and requires that, in
sentencing a criminal defendant or (as in this case) when hearing an I.C.R. 35(c) motion for
credit for time served, the court give the appropriate credit . . . .” State v. Moore, 156 Idaho 17,
20-21 (Ct. App. 2014).  “This means that the defendant is entitled to credit for all time spent
incarcerated,” as defined by the statute. Id.
Idaho Code section 18-309 governs when credit must be given for both pre- and post-
judgment incarceration and provides, in relevant part:
(1) In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom the
judgment was entered, shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of
incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was for the offense
or an included offense for which the judgment was entered. . . .
I.C. § 18-309(1) (emphasis added).  The language of Idaho Code section 18–309 entitles a
defendant to credit for “any period of incarceration” and notably does not base credit on any
factor other than actual incarceration.
The plain language of Idaho Code section 18-309(1) is unambiguous. State v. Owens,
158 Idaho 1, 4 (2015).  “Statutory interpretation begins with the statute’s plain language.” Id. at
3.  The Court “considers the statute as a whole, and gives words their plain, usual, and ordinary
meanings.” Id. “When the statute’s language is unambiguous, the legislature’s clearly expressed
intent must be given effect, and [the Court does] not need to go beyond the statute’s plain
language to consider other rules of statutory construction.” Id. This case involves the
interpretation of the second phrase of Idaho Code section 18-309(1):  “if such incarceration was
for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered.”  I.C. § 18-309(1).
Examining the plain language of this second phrase, it is clear that Idaho Code section 18-309
mandates credit for prejudgment time served for an offense regardless of any concurrent
incarceration for other offenses or cases.
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The language of Idaho Code section 18-309 can be compared to Idaho Code section
19-2603, which governs the determination of credit for time served following a probation
violation and provides:
The defendant shall receive credit for time served from the date of service of a
bench warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to believe the
defendant has violated a condition of probation, for any time served following an
arrest of the defendant pursuant to section 20-227, Idaho Code, and for any time
served as a condition of probation under the withheld judgment or suspended
sentence.
I.C. § 19-2603 (emphasis added). “Under the plain terms of I.C. § 19-2603, a defendant is
entitled to credit for time served from service of a bench warrant for a probation violation.”
State v. Bitkoff, 157 Idaho 410, 413 (Ct. App. 2014).  Clearly the Idaho Legislature was aware of
how to craft language limiting credit for time served from the date of service of a warrant, but, in
drafting this statute, Idaho Code section 18-309, it chose not to limit the credit in such a manner.
In State v. Brand, the Idaho Supreme Court recently decided the issue of whether a
defendant is entitled to credit for time served when the defendant is being held on charges from
more than one county. State v. Brand, No. 44221, 2017 WL 2350303, at *3 (Idaho May 31,
2017).  In Brand, the Court held that, in determining whether the defendant is entitled to credit, a
two-part test is applied, “first, the defendant must have been incarcerated during the intervening
period from when the arrest warrant was served and the judgment of conviction was entered; and
second, putting aside any alternative reason for the defendant's incarceration, the relevant offense
must be one that provides a basis for the defendant's incarceration.” Id.
That is, the plain language of the statute does not limit entitlement to credit to only apply
in those circumstances where a warrant is served, but mandates credit for “any period  of
incarceration.”  I.C. § 18-309 (emphasis added).  It provides that a defendant is entitled to credit
where “such incarceration was for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was
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entered,” and does not require the service of a warrant before a defendant can be deemed
incarcerated for the offense.  I.C. § 18-309; State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 4 (2015) (holding that
“Idaho Code section 18-309's language plainly gives credit for prejudgment time in custody
against each count's sentence”, and “does not limit that credit in any way”).
The analysis in Brand comports  with  the  award  of  credit  to  a  defendant  in
Ms. Gonzalez’s situation:
Put another way, section 18-309 entitles Brand and Nall to credit for time served
“as  long  as  [their]  prejudgment  jail  time  was  for  ‘the  offense’  [they  were]
convicted of and sentenced for[.]” Owens, 158 Idaho at 4, 343 P.3d at 33. Aside
from that requirement, the statute “does not limit that credit in any way.” Id.
Section 18-309 does not limit credit for time served only if, for example, the
offense for which the defendant is jailed is that which caused the defendant's
initial deprivation of liberty. Rather, section 18-309 applies to all offenses that
provide a basis for the defendant's incarceration. It is irrelevant if the defendant's
incarceration rests on several, unrelated offenses, as the fact remains that each
offense provides a basis for the defendant's incarceration.
Brand, 2017 WL 2350303, at *3.
Here, the record establishes that a warrant was issued in the Bannock County case on
October 21, 2015.  (R., p.9.)  On December 14, 2015, at an in-custody arraignment hearing held
by the district court in Canyon County, the court informed Ms. Gonzalez of the Bannock County
warrant and her options.  (R., p.20.)  The minutes of this hearing indicate that Ms. Gonzales was
thereafter remanded to the custody of the sheriff with a $25,000 bond.  (R., p.20.)  Ms. Gonzalez
was held for Bannock County from December 11, 2015, until she was officially served with the
warrant on March 3, 2016. 2   (R.,  pp.2,  9,  87.)   Ms.  Gonzalez  was  sentenced  on  her  Canyon
2 The record does not indicate what document or documents, if any, were sent to Canyon County
to effectuate the hold; however, similar to the facts of State v. Rogers,  a  copy of  the  unserved
bench warrant that was issued back in October of 2015, or even a telephone call could have been
used to detain Ms. Gonzalez. See State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223 (2004) (finding that the district
court did not intend to relinquish jurisdiction and it had asked the prosecutor to get a bench
warrant lodged as a detainer).
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County charges on March 7, 2016, and an arraignment order to attend the preliminary hearing on
her Bannock County charges was entered on March 10, 2016.  (R., pp.2, 23, 28, 86; Idaho
Supreme Court Data Repository.)   Ms. Gonzalez remained in custody until she pled guilty to the
Bannock County charges on April 19, 2016, and was sentenced on May 2, 2016.  (R., pp.28,
41-42, 50, 55-56, 69 77-80.)
In response to Ms. Gonzalez’s motion for credit for time served, the district court credited
her with the amount of time from when she was served with the Bannock County arrest warrant
to when she was sentenced in Bannock County—from March 3, 2016, to May 2, 2016.  (R.,
pp.94-95.)  However, the district court otherwise denied Ms. Gonzalez’s motion for credit for
time served.  (See R., pp.94-95.)  However, this was error as the analysis in Brand comports with
the award of credit to a defendant held on another county’s charges such as existed in
Ms. Gonzalez’s situation.3  Once  Bannock  County  placed   a  hold  on  Ms.  Gonzalez  on
December 11, 2015, she was being held on those offenses and was therefore entitled to the
additional credit from December 11, 2015, to March 3, 2016.  Therefore, the district court erred
in denying Ms. Gonzalez credit for time served as she is entitled to 82 additional days of credit
for time served on her Bannock County case.
3 Admittedly, the district court did not have the benefit of the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in
Brand when it denied Ms. Gonzalez’s motion for credit for time served; however, in light of the
Court’s clarification on the entry of credit for time served when a defendant is incarcerated on
charges  from  multiple  counties,  Ms.  Gonzalez  asks  the  Court  to  reverse  the  district  court’s
decision denying her credit.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Ms. Gonzalez respectfully requests that this Court order
that she be given additional credit for time served in the amount of 82 days.
DATED this 31st day of July, 2017.
/s/
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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